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Abstract
The importance of power is underlined by many scientists who view it as a key
behavioral construct. Power distinguishes itself as an effective tool in coordinating
and promoting harmonious relationships, solving conflicts, and enhancing performance.
An important challenge is to determine what role power plays in managing business-
to-business relationships with specific attention to coordination and cooperation. The
aim of our work is to investigate the role of power in business-to-business relationships
to work out a strategy that enables managers to select an effective mix of power
mechanisms. We work out and test a theoretical model of the effects of power on
cooperation and coordination in business-to-business relationships and discuss possible
managerial implications. To verify our research hypotheses, we conduct expert
interviews via telephone about relationships of international food processing companies
with their suppliers in Russia.
Keywords: Business-to-business relationships, Supply chain management, Power,
Focal company
Background
A crucial question in supply chain management (SCM) is how to align the actions and
interests of the multitude of involved companies (Ellram and Cooper 1990; Mentzer et
al. 2001). In this context, a huge body of literature deals with trust as an appropriate
tool (Bachmann 2001; Belaya et al. 2015; Gulati 1995; Jones and George 1998). How-
ever, taking a look at the agri-food business, most often supply chains consist of a
powerful retailer or processor coordinating various less powerful suppliers and/or
buyers. In such an environment, trust is often non-existent and very hard to establish,
whereas power1 is “naturally” there (Cox 2001a; Maloni and Benton 2000; Reve and
Stern 1979; Wilkinson 1973). However, the question arises whether power can be used
to align the interests and actions of the various actors.
Several studies on marketing channels have shown that channel power has a signifi-
cant impact on the buyer-supplier relationship (Chatziaslan et al. 2005; Etgar 1978;
Gaski and Nevin 1985; Lee 2001; Liu and Wang 2000; Skinner et al. 1992). The role of
power is crucial in the sense that it can seriously hamper cooperation (Hingley 2005;
Kumar 2005; Sodano 2006). On the other hand, Cox (2001b) stated that power can be
used very effectively to achieve a better deal between buyers and suppliers in supply
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chains. Therefore, the ability to use power to influence other supply chain actors distin-
guishes itself as an excellent tool for coordinating and promoting harmonious relation-
ships, solving conflicts, and enhancing performance of the whole network and its
members. The biggest advantage of using power could be its commanding nature
which is perfectly suited for completing specific tasks in SCM.
In this vein, the actual role of power in business-to-business relationships has been
treated in contrasting ways in the literature. For many decades, there has been a discus-
sion about the positive (bright side) and negative (dark side) aspects of power (Craig
and Gabler 1963). Intriguing and important research questions have arisen regarding
how to distinguish among and deal with the two sides of power to avoid problems and
how to use power as an effective tool for supply chain management.
Our work aims to investigate the role of power in business-to-business relationships
to develop a strategy that enables supply chain managers to select an effective mix of
power mechanisms. We look at both views presented in the literature—positive and
negative—and present a conceptual framework on how the different aspects of power
can be used as mechanisms in chain management. Chain management consists of both
the alignment of interests (cooperation) and the alignment of actions (coordination)
(Hanf and Dautzenberg 2006), so we explicitly discuss the positive and negative effects
of power on cooperation and coordination issues.
To do so, we critically examine the existing literature and elaborate on the role of
power in supply chain relationships. We work out and test a theoretical model of the
effects of power on cooperation and coordination and discuss possible managerial
implications of using power as an effective tool for promoting SCM. To verify our
research hypotheses, we conducted expert interviews via telephone about relationships
of international food processing companies with their suppliers in Russia. We have de-
liberately chosen Russia because many international food retail and food processing
companies earn a significant share of their revenue there. It is observed that by going
abroad, retailers as well as branded food processors export their supply chain manage-
ment concepts into new markets, both in the sense of enhanced efficiency and in the
sense of global chain quality concepts. Due to the tightening of quality standards and
the need to work together with suppliers, one of the main consequences is the estab-
lishment of tightly coordinated chain organizations (Belaya and Hanf 2010).
The two sides of power in business-to-business relationships
The previous research results about power effects on exchange relationships are very
contradictory. We follow the definition of power by French and Raven (1959), who
state that power is “the ability to manage the perceptions of the other party.” This def-
inition suits the context of the business-to-business relationships specifically because it
implies that the more powerful firm can use power to manage the relationship with its
business partners. However, talking about power in the generic sense is not enough.
Rather, it is necessary to be specific about the nature of power structures to understand
how power is used (Kumar 2005). Furthermore, because the actual effect of power
depends on its source (French and Raven 1959), we examine its effects in terms of dif-
ferent power bases using the expanded classification of power bases (French and Raven
1959) by Raven and Kruglanski (1970)2: coercive power, reward power, expert power,
informational power, legitimate power, and referent power.
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The dark side of power
The dark side of power is noted by a number of authors who view the concept of
power as alien to the effective workings of exchange relationships and success and state
that power negates cooperation (Bretherton and Carswell 2002; Doney and Cannon
1997). Naudé and Buttle (2000) express the common view of power as a negative influ-
ence and unhelpful in the building of relationship quality, an area in which the most
important cited attributes of a good supply chain relationship are trust, integration,
mutual understanding of needs, profit, and satisfaction. Kumar et al. (1998) also view
power as the antithesis of trust. Many authors state that over time, the firm with the
power advantage consistently abuses the other firm (Stern and Reve 1980) or that the
manufacturer exploits the weaker suppliers to obtain superior economic returns (Dore
1983; Perrow 1970). Johnsen and Ford (2001) posit that according to the nature of
power relationships, more powerful actors attempt to control the resources of the less
powerful actors and limit their ability to take advantage of new opportunities, such as
the development of new international markets and customer relationships. Some stud-
ies emphasize the necessity for symmetry and mutuality to foster longer-term relation-
ships, while power asymmetries are associated with less stability and more conflict and
are considered to be detrimental to sustaining a business relationship (Ganesan 1994;
Rokkan and Haugland 2002). According to Kähkönen and Anni-Kaisa (2014), the rela-
tionships between buyers and sellers are mostly uneven. They state that buyers have
usually more power and relationships of balanced power are rather rare.
Negative effect of power on the alignment of interests (cooperation)
Some researchers have been specific about the nature of power and argued that one
who holds a high level of power will exploit the other party by frequently using rela-
tively coercive influence strategies (Bannister 1969; Robicheaux and El-Ansary 1975;
Stern and El-Ansary 1972). For example, one might use power to negotiate lower costs,
higher quality, delivery times, and special exigencies (Maloni and Benton 1997), which
is considered to be detrimental to the weaker actor (Stolte and Emerson 1976; Thompson
1967). Therefore, power imbalance in supply chain relationships creates opportunities for
more powerful firms to act opportunistically by exercising coercion, which may ultimately
undermine the trust within the relationship (Belaya and Hanf 2012). One likely conse-
quence is that when one party is threatened by the imbalance of power, that weaker party
will be more likely to seek alternative alliances (Ireland and Webb 2007) and the power
holder may fail to reach its long-term goals. In other words, coercion is the classical ex-
ample of the negative side of power. Exercising power against other members of the sup-
ply chain might provide short-term benefits for the focal organization but ultimately
reduces its success in the long term (Cousins 2002). However, most of the studies on
coercion measure the direct effects on the cooperating partners. The negative view on
its effects on cooperation is altered if the indirect effects are taken into account (Fehr
and Gächter 2002; Walter 2011). If in a group of cooperating actors a known free rider
receives a punishment he deserves, the overall cooperativeness within the group
increases (Carlsmith 2006; Carlsmith et al. 2002). Furthermore, in the context of
deterrence, possible punishments help to avoid free riding (Falk et al. 2005; Fehr and
Gächter 2000; Guzman et al. 2007). Etgar (1976) states that expert, referent, and
legitimate power sources may be less effective than coercive and reward power
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sources because they are less flexible and are often viewed as being unrelated to spe-
cific performance by chain members. Furthermore, their effectiveness may decline
over time. As for legitimate power, it is difficult to predict the reaction of a weaker
party because the latter may choose not to enter the relationship if it feels intimidated.
French and Raven (1959) state that legitimate power stems from internalized values
which dictate that there is a legitimate right to influence and an obligation to accept
this influence. Giebels et al. (1998) express the opinion that when there is a power im-
balance, there appears to be difficulty in fostering the information flow, which is a
precondition for the successful negotiation of an exchange. Gaski (1986) argues that
the use of informational power involves manipulative aspects. Stern and El-Ansary
(1992) also support the statement that informational power is likely to have a negative
effect on cooperation in distribution channels. They argue that channel participants
do not necessarily view each other as partners, but rather as rivals, and therefore, the
use of informational power in this case is not well received. In the literature, reward
power has been seen as having a mixed effect on the buyer-supplier relationship
(Maloni and Benton 2000; Zhao et al. 2008). It was suggested that reward power has a
positive effect when the culture supports cooperative and supportive relationships.
However, it can be assumed that reward power may have an element of coercion in it
and therefore have the same effect as coercive power on relationships. Overuse of re-
ward power is likely to damage relational norms (Boyle et al. 1992) and cooperation
(Skinner et al. 1992). Furthermore, Goldsmith and Dhar (2013) showed that negatively
rather than positively framed incentives motivate people to work harder.
Negative effect of power on the alignment of actions (coordination)
According to Mohr et al. (1996), coordination between parties is enhanced when a
more standardized business format is applied. This idea is also mirrored in the studies
of Lusch and Brown (1996) and Jap and Ganesan (2000), who state that contracts,
which present clear guidelines and specify the rights and obligations of both parties,
improve coordination. Clemons and Row (1993) showed that although it might seem
that information could help improve coordination, the weaker party might not neces-
sarily respond positively to the coordination attempts of the power holder, who is using
information and expertise as a tool of its bargaining power.
Lee et al. (1997) also support the idea that coordination is different from information
sharing. Information can be shared, but there may not be any alignment in terms of incen-
tives, objectives, and decisions, as is required for coordination. Coordination exists for the
purpose of decision-making in the best interest of the system (Zhao et al. 2002); however,
some agents may have information which they do not want to share with the principal.
The bright side of power
Many authors state that power appears to be synonymous with oppression, coercion,
and force, despite the fact that such negative approaches are just one aspect of power
(Duke 1998). Despite criticism of power as the antithesis of trust, Kumar et al. (1995)
contend that trusting partnerships can be built between unequals but only if the power-
ful party treats the weaker, vulnerable party fairly. A body of literature states that power
can be used by the focal actor as an effective tool in coordinating and promoting har-
monious relationships, solving conflicts, and, therefore, enhancing the performance of
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the whole network as well as its individual members. Some authors who have empha-
sized power’s positive aspects argue that possession of power does not suggest exploit-
ation or frequent use of coercion (Blau 1964; Stern and Heskett 1969). Power does not
necessarily imply coercion or use of force; it may involve any degree of compulsion,
from the gentlest suggestion to absolute domination (Beier and Stern 1969).
Others argue that power is vital because it can take the relationship out of the realm
of chance and give it purpose, order, and direction (Dwyer et al. 1987; Kumar 2005).
Condliffe (1944) says that power, including the possible use of force, is not necessarily
evil but may be used to achieve moral purposes. Other researchers have emphasized
the role of power in the effective coordination of the exchange relationship, rather than
its potential for exploitation. Blau (1964) provides the underlying foundation for this
viewpoint. In a marketing channel context, Stern and Heskett (1969) theorize that the
exercise of power can have a positive role in the achievement of integration, adaptation,
and goal attainment within the channel system. Bierstedt (1950) suggests that power
stands behind every association and sustains its structure; without power, there is no
organization and no order.
Positive effect of power on the alignment of interests (cooperation)
The exercise of non-coercive power does not include any aggressive elements that may
produce friction in the relationship. On the contrary, it fosters a relatively high level of
agreement between the interacting parties because to a large extent, it contains the in-
herent desirability of performing certain actions (Frazier and Summers 1984). More-
over, the use of non-coercive power helps to increase financial and social benefits,
through, for example, the offering of financial rewards, provision of assistance, and ac-
cess to specialized information (Wilkinson 1979). Therefore, this type of power can
help to promote common interests and collective goals within the relationship, as well
as enhance a friendly and constructive atmosphere (Gagalyuk et al. 2013).
Scientists found that firms exposed to exercise of influence by a “partner firm” are
more satisfied with the relationship if non-coercive power, rather than coercive power,
is used (Hunt and Nevin 1974; Lusch 1977). Scientists also found that non-coercive
power sources are inversely related and coercive sources are directly related to the
existence of interfirm conflict (Lusch 1976; Wilkinson 1981) and that the use of non-
coercive power sources is positively related to the performance of the firm that is
exposed to exercise of influence by the “partner firm” (Sibley and Michie 1981). Fur-
thermore, scholars who have studied power suggested that non-coercive power sources
provide better alternatives for enhancing the satisfaction of less powerful trading part-
ners (Hunt and Nevin 1974; Lusch 1976). The study conducted by Lee and Low (2008)
indicates that legitimate power showed positive relationships with satisfaction. Legitim-
ate power originates from a given position or existing norms or laws, so the supplier
may take the protection offered by a buyer’s legitimized powerful position for an add-
itional advantage. Dapiran and Hogarth-Scott (2003) emphasize that cooperation comes
from the use of expert and referent power.
Because referent power was ranked highest among other power bases in connection
to satisfaction (Lee and Low 2008), and cooperation has been found to go hand in hand
with satisfaction (Gaski 1984), we suppose that a buyer’s positive image and good repu-
tation will foster cooperation. Suppliers would also be more willing to comply with the
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requirements of internationally recognized retailers and fulfill their commands. As
noted by Eyuboglu and Atac (1991), depending on the channel, informational power
will have different effects on cooperation. Gaski (1986) states that partner perceptions
(such as expert, referent, and legitimate power sources) are managed through reward
and coercive power sources to create harmonious and enduring interorganizational ex-
change relationships.
Positive effect of power on the alignment of actions (coordination)
Some authors see a positive side of power in promoting coordination in supply chain
relationships. Bachmann (2001) states that power can be regarded as a mechanism for
coordinating social interactions efficiently and allows relatively stable relationships to
develop between cooperating social actors. Stern and El-Ansary (1992) assert that chan-
nel members use power to determine who will undertake which marketing activities,
coordinate the performance of these tasks, and manage conflict among themselves. The
positive effect of legitimate power has been observed as contributing to the effective
coordination of exchange relationships as the distribution of power has become legit-
imate over time (Frazier and Antia 1995; Kalafatis 2000). When a customer uses reward
or coercive power, the supplier is extrinsically motivated to commit to it and comply
with the customer’s requirements to achieve favorable outcomes (Zhao et al. 2007).
Framework of the effects of power on cooperation and coordination
Having examined the existing literature, our findings illustrate that power has two sides
that play an important role in supply chain management. Based on the literature, we
assume that both sides of power could be used effectively to achieve cooperation and
coordination among supply chain actors. Thus, we develop the theoretical model of the
effects of power on cooperation and coordination and formulate research hypotheses
H1a–H6b with specific attention to cooperation and coordination issues (Fig. 1).
Fig. 1 Theoretical model of the effects of power on coordination and cooperation. Source: own illustration
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Researchers agree that the frequent use of power to force other partners into action
will lead to the exploitation of the target (Bannister 1969; Robicheaux and El-Ansary
1975), which is detrimental to the quality of relationship (Gellynck et al. 2011; Stolte
and Emerson 1976; Thompson 1967). Hunt and Nevin (1974) indicated that coercive
power is related positively to intrachannel conflict and inversely to dealer satisfaction,
whereas non-coercive power exhibits the opposite relationships. Exercising coercive
power against other members of the supply chain might have short-term benefits for
the focal organization but reduces its success in the long term (Cousins 2002). How-
ever, Stern and El-Ansary (1992) asserted that channel members may use power to de-
termine who will undertake which marketing activities, coordinate the performance of
these tasks, and manage conflict among themselves. Hamner and Organ (1978) sug-
gested that punishment is one of the most readily available means for shaping (and
maintaining) the behavior of subordinates. Other authors viewed coercive power as a
mechanism for allowing relatively stable relationships to develop between cooperating
social actors (Bachmann 2001; Stern and El-Ansary 1992).
Within a supply chain, the perceived use of coercive power will positively affect co-
ordination (H1a) and negatively affect cooperation (H1b).
Gaski (1986) stated that it is through reward and coercive power that partner per-
ceptions are managed to create harmonious and enduring relationships. If the use of
power is based on genuine rewards, the supplier will be willing to accept them and
enter a trusting relationship. If a buyer continuously uses reward power to give re-
wards to its suppliers who comply with its quality standards and deliver on time, it
can promote cooperation and generate trust in this relationship. Assuming that re-
ward power provides extrinsic motivation, which drives partners to comply with the
requirements to achieve favorable outcomes (Zhao et al. 2008), it will have a positive
effect on coordination. However, the overly frequent use of reward power is likely to
damage relational norms (Boyle et al. 1992) and cooperation (Skinner et al. 1992).
Therefore, the exaggerated use of reward power may lead to distrust, suspicion, and
eventually abstaining from entering a trusting relationship by a target of influence; in
other words, if unrealistically high discounts or other offered rewards are unusual
for the culture or mentality of the latter, they may be associated with corruption or
bad purposes.
Within a supply chain, the perceived use of reward power will positively affect coord-
ination (H2a) and negatively affect cooperation (H2b).
Expert power is considered to be less effective than coercive and reward power due
to being less flexible and unrelated to specific performance of supply chain members
(Etgar 1976). In general, the acquisition of special knowledge or technology to achieve
a powerful position and the use of expert power formed in this way will contribute to
the positive development of cooperation within a supply chain relationship. Expert
power is perceived as positive when solicited and given. Offering free advice through
an agency and advisory staff as part of project implementation is seen to be a valuable
incentive for the target of influence to get involved in the project (Davies et al. 2004).
Furthermore, some authors emphasized that consultation and swapping of information
might produce expectations of reciprocity and trust (Blau 1964; Coleman 1990). Thus,
expert power could be most effective as an influence tactic when the objectives of the
person being influenced match those of the leader.
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Within a supply chain, the perceived use of expert power will negatively affect coord-
ination (H3a) and positively affect cooperation (H3b).
Gaski (1986) argued that the use of informational power involves manipulative as-
pects. Stern and El-Ansary (1992) supported the statement that informational power is
likely to have a negative effect on coordination in channels of distribution. They argued
that channel participants do not necessarily view each other as partners but rather as
rivals. Payan and McFarland (2005) found that information exchange has a lower likeli-
hood of compliance with the requirements of the influencing. As noted by Eyuboglu
and Atac (1991), depending on the channel, informational power will have different ef-
fects on cooperation. Information exchange could have a positive effect on cooperation,
since it not only conforms to but also elevates the level of relationalism between parties
(Boyle et al. 1992) and is based on mutual trust (Baldwin 1971; Raven and Kruglanski
1970). We assume that in an environment in which participating parties view each
other as partners and not as rivals, informational power will have a positive effect on
cooperation because it helps to build trust and enhances positive attitudes toward the
long-term channel relationships.
Within a supply chain, the perceived use of informational power will negatively affect
coordination (H4a) and positively affect cooperation (H4b).
The study conducted by Lee and Low (2008) indicated that legitimate power showed
positive relationships with satisfaction. Effective coordination of exchange relationships
has been observed as a positive effect of legitimate power (Frazier and Antia 1995;
Kalafatis 2000), and a more standardized business format is applied, such as contracts
(Jap and Ganesan 2000; Lusch and Brown 1996; Mohr et al. 1996). Boyce et al. (1992)
suggested that in the effective operation of an agreement, it is the spirit rather than the
written word that is important. The written word becomes significant when things are
going wrong. According to this statement, legal contracts specifying formal written
rules and obligations could be a harder form of legitimate power than the cooperative
norm, which only refers to unwritten unofficial norms, unofficial values, norms, shared
values, rules of conduct, and beliefs that guide actions and behaviors. Regulations and
economic incentives play an important role in encouraging changes in behavior, but al-
though these may change practices, there is no guaranteed positive effect on personal
attitudes (Gardner and Stern 1996).
Within a supply chain, the perceived use of legitimate power will positively affect co-
ordination (H5a) and negatively affect cooperation (H5b).
Because referent power was ranked highest among other types of power in connec-
tion to satisfaction (Lee and Low 2008), and since cooperation has been found to go
hand in hand with satisfaction (Gaski 1986), we suppose that the use of a positive
image and good reputation will foster the development of cooperation. Dapiran and
Hogarth-Scott (2003) emphasized that cooperation comes about through the use of ex-
pert and referent power. Suppliers would also be more willing to comply with the re-
quirements of internationally recognized buyers and fulfill their commands. However,
high degrees of identification between buyers and suppliers may be associated with less
channel control. Referent power might not be sufficient to motivate the target to the
implementation of certain tasks because they do not represent an explicit statement of
the desired behavior. Therefore, using referent power might not be sufficient to ani-
mate the target to the implementation of certain tasks.
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Within a supply chain, the perceived use of referent power will negatively affect
coordination (H6a) and positively affect cooperation (H6b).
Methods
Empirical study of the Russian agri-food business
Data collection
To verify our research hypotheses, we conducted semi-structured, in-depth, expert
interviews via telephone about relationships between international food processing
and retail companies and their suppliers in Russia from the 31st of March until
the 17th of June 2010. The database for the telephone survey was obtained from
The Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation and contained
1000 records of contact details about the companies of foreign origin registered in
Russia as companies operating in the area of food processing in Russia with at
least 10 % of foreign direct investment capital. A total of 97 complete telephone
interviews (89 interviews with food processing companies and 8 interviews with re-
tailers) were conducted.3
We made a thorough selection of the interviewees who were chosen according to
their leading positions to effectively gather relevant information (Blankertz 1998;
Merkens 2000; Patton 1990). Specifically, we employed an expert (concentration) sam-
pling (Fritsch 2007; Patton 1990). The people chosen were in positions with a high level
of concentration of appropriate information. The applied technique makes particular
sense in light of the abovementioned research questions. Before contacting the com-
panies from the database, we made a thorough pretest study by contacting 15 experts
from the field of agri-food business and conducting telephone conversations with them.
This pretest allowed us to identify potential problems and to revise the proposed ques-
tionnaire before starting the actual fieldwork. We started the survey after receiving
their feedback and improving the questionnaire. The questionnaire was designed in
three languages (Russian, English, and German) to allow the experts speaking different
languages to participate in the questionnaire. Because the majority of the respondents
wanted to be treated anonymously and did not give their permission to tape-record the
interviews, they were logged in written form.
The survey tool contained three main sections (Section I: Mechanisms for managing
agri-food supply chains, Section II: Problems of managing agri-food supply chains, and
Section III: Information about the interviewee and his business partners). The ques-
tions were grouped according to the thematically connected blocks within each section.
We applied a four-point scale (e.g., frequency of use of influence strategies: 1—“not at
all,” 2—“seldom,” 3—“often,” 4—“very often”; the state of satisfaction with coordination
and cooperation aspects: 1—“very dissatisfied,” 2—“dissatisfied,” 3—“satisfied,” 4—“very
satisfied”). The answer option “don’t know” was also given to increase the reliability of
the answers. One of the first questions asked was “Do you feel responsible for coordinat-
ing the supply chain of this product (“from the field to the fork”)?.” Two answer options
were given: “yes” and “no.” We only used companies that answered “yes” as we selected
for focal companies which were the target of our research.
To test our model, we used the partial least squares (PLS) technique for structural equa-
tion modeling and applied the SmartPLS software 2.0.1 (Ringle et al. 2005).
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Results and discussion
According to Hair et al. (2006), an item is considered insignificant and removed from the
model if its factor loading is less than 0.4. The remaining indicators represent more than
50 % of the share of the variance of each indicator in respect to the corresponding latent
variable and can be considered as the most reliable. Based on this criterion, we removed 23
indicators from the initial model to achieve the indicator reliability for our model (Fig. 2).
The internal consistency of the model was assessed by calculating the Cronbach α
and composite reliability (Table 1). Cronbach’s α is a measure of internal consistency
and must not be lower than 0.6. In our case, all variables except for legitimate power
have their Cronbach’s α within the borders of the advised number. Unfortunately, the
measure of Cronbach’s α for legitimate power is 0.523, which is slightly lower than 0.6.
Nevertheless, the composite reliability is achieved for this variable as it is for all the
other variables. The composite reliability is a measure of internal consistency and must
not be lower than 0.6. In our case, it is even better because it is over 0.7. The conver-
gent validity of the model was assessed by calculating the average variance extracted
(AVE) which should be higher than 0.5 (Fornell and Larckner 1981). The variable that
does not quite correspond with this rule is cooperation. The measure of AVE for this
construct is slightly lower and equals 0.473.
The next step of our analysis is to evaluate the fit of the structural (inner) model. We
do this by assessing discriminant validity by comparing the square root of the AVE with
the correlation between the construct and the other constructs (Table 2). The structural
model was also evaluated based on the R2 values and the significance of the path coeffi-
cients using the bootstrap method. Usually, R2 values of 0.67, 0.33, and 0.19 can be
regarded as substantial, moderate, and weak, respectively (Chin 1998). In model 1, the
constructs coordination and cooperation have the values of R2 0.305 and 0.332, which
considering the complexity of the research model indicate a good fit (Table 3). Follow-
ing Martinez-Ruiz and Aluja-Banet (2009) to assess the significance of path coeffi-
cients, standard errors and t values may be computed by bootstrapping (200 samples;
t value >1.65 significant at the 0.05 level; t value >2 significant at the 0.01 level). We
Fig. 2 Graphical representation of the model in SmartPLS. Source: own illustration
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used the method of bootstrapping (sample = 200) to generate t-statistics to test the
significance levels of standardized path estimates. According to the results, 6 out of 12
hypotheses (H1a, H1b, H3a, H3b, H4b, H6a) were significant and 4 out of 12 hypoth-
eses (H1a, H3a, H4a, H6a) did not have the expected sign. The values were significant
and the signs were positive for the following hypotheses: H3a, H3b, H4b, and H6a.
The values were significant but the expected sign was different for the following hy-
potheses: H1a, H3a, and H6a. When the values are significant and the signs are posi-
tive, the model provides empirical support of hypothesized effects. Therefore, these
hypotheses were supported in our model. If the values are insignificant and the signs
are contrary to the assumed effects, the hypotheses are not supported. In our case, the
values are insignificant and the signs are contrary to the assumed effects for hypoth-
esis H4a. Therefore, this hypothesis was not supported in our model. The results of
hypotheses testing are presented in Table 4.
The knowledge of different power sources is essential to successfully managing
business-to-business relationships. Managers should be particularly aware that power,
depending on its source, may have different effects on coordination and cooperation.
In line with our observations in the in-depth expert interviews, Hofstede (2001)
and Kadochnikov (2004) have shown that there is a positive attitude in the Russian
Table 1 Results of the assessment of measurement model: Cronbach’s α, composite reliability,
and AVE
Latent variables Cronbach’s α Composite reliability AVE
COOR 0.719285 0.813111 0.527487
COOP 0.757797 0.836368 0.473304
CP 0.805315 0.910199 0.835268
RWP 0.734857 0.817823 0.534618
EP 0.807736 0.852956 0.547956
IP 0.846552 0.884829 0.561973
LP 0.523012 0.706973 0.584865
RFP 0.715612 0.875101 0.777990
Source: own calculations
Abbreviations: COOR coordination, COOP cooperation, CP coercive power, RWP reward power, EP expert power, IP informational
power, LP legitimate power, RFP referent power
Table 2 Correlations of the latent variables and the AVE square roots
COOP COOR CP EP IP LP RFP RWP
COOP 0.687971
COOR 0.423507 0.726283
CP −0.249700 −0.181373 0.913930
EP 0.375932 0.419556 0.179414 0.740241
IP 0.372067 0.271215 0.128049 0.580504 0.749649
LP −0.306813 −0.248269 0.435816 −0.199264 −0.158320 0.764765
RFP 0.257241 0.360260 0.086310 0.321386 0.273676 −0.209867 0.882037
RWP 0.085145 0.231527 0.048065 0.423462 0.384902 −0.295605 0.260505 0.731176
Source: own calculations
Abbreviations: COOR coordination, COOP cooperation, CP coercive power, RWP reward power, EP expert power, IP informational
power, LP legitimate power, RFP referent power
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culture toward power and hierarchical orders. Thus, the rejection of our assumption
that coercive power can be seen to bring order and discipline into the relationship as
well as be effective in changing behavior was unexpected. An explanation might be
that the interviewees assessed the direct effects of coercion in a bilateral rather than
in a multilateral case. However, as many experiments have shown (e.g., Carlsmith
2006; Fehr and Gächter 2002), particularly for larger groups, coercion in the form of
a deserved and justified punishment and/or deterrence can help to avoid free riding.
Furthermore, according to our general impression, the respondents were reluctant to
speak about the use of coercive power. Therefore, coercive power could have been
used in reality more often than the respondents were ready to admit. In spite of these
Table 3 Results of the assessment of structural model







H1a CP→ COOR 3.142365 −0.276474 −0.181373 0.050
H1b CP→ COOP 3.211364 −0.291692 −0.249700 0.073
H2a RWP→ COOR 0.172568 0.016637 0.231527 0.004
H2b RWP→ COOP 1.476850 −0.193422 0.085145 −0.016
H3a EP→ COOR 3.836822 0.372217 0.419556 0.156
H3b EP→ COOP 2.418828 0.292702 0.375932 0.110
H4a IP→ COOR 0.130923 0.014832 0.271215 0.004
H4b IP→ COOP 2.736924 0.257051 0.372067 0.096
H5a LP→ COOR 0.078643 0.007748 −0.248269 −0.002
H5b LP→ COOP 1.037731 −0.107228 −0.306813 0.033
H6a RFP→ COOR 2.910312 0.257730 0.360260 0.093
H6b RFP→ COOP 1.588292 0.145881 0.257241 0.038
Source: own calculations
Abbreviations: COOR coordination, COOP cooperation, CP coercive power, RWP reward power, EP expert power, IP informational
power, LP legitimate power, RFP referent power
Table 4 Information about the results of hypotheses testing
Hypotheses Effects of latent variables Expected sign Obtained sign Supported/not supported
H1a CP→ COOR + − Not supported
H1b CP→ COOP − − Supported
H2a RWP→ COOR + + Supported
H2b RWP→ COOP − − Supported
H3a EP→ COOR − + Not supported
H3b EP→ COOP + + Supported
H4a IP→ COOR − + Not supported
H4b IP→ COOP + + Supported
H5a LP→ COOR + + Supported
H5b LP→ COOP − − Supported
H6a RFP→ COOR − + Not supported
H6b RFP→ COOP + + Supported
Source: own calculations. Hypotheses which turned insignificant according to the results of t-statistics and, therefore,
should not be considered as reliable are marked italic
Abbreviations: COOR coordination, COOP cooperation, CP coercive power, RWP reward power, EP expert power, IP informational
power, LP legitimate power, RFP referent power
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reservations, based on our empirical results, we do not advise managers to apply
coercive power.
According to our assumptions, reward power should have a negative effect on co-
operation and a positive effect on coordination. The results show that our assumptions
about the hypothesized effects of reward power on coordination as well as on cooper-
ation were correct. In general, we observed that the use of this type of power provokes
changes in behavior and motivates the target of influence to act according to the will of
the influencing party. Therefore, it is highly recommended to apply reward power for
improving both coordination and cooperation.
The use of expert power turned out to have a positive effect on coordination as well as
on cooperation despite being considered less flexible and unrelated to specific performance
from the theoretical point of view. The results are in line with Busch and Wilson (1976).
They show that in particular, expertise is essential for building trust in buyer-supplier
dyads. Overall, expert power has had relatively strong effects on cooperation as well as on
coordination; thus, we recommend to use this type of power as often as possible.
The effects of informational power are similar to the effects of expert power, though
the effect in the case of informational power on cooperation is much weaker than that
of expert power. Similar results have been obtained by Eyuboglu and Atac (1991) who
concluded that informational power could serve as a superior means for increased con-
trol distribution channels. In our in-depth survey, the experts have revealed similar in-
sights. However, the interviewed experts have been rather hesitant regarding the
possibility of using informational power in business reality.
According to our findings, the effects of legitimate power turned out to be positive
for coordination and negative for cooperation. One must admit, though, that in spite of
the positive sign of the effect on coordination, the strength of this effect turned out to
be quite weak. Our expert interviews revealed that on the one hand, as long as all chain
participants perceive the legitimate position as fairly obtained, legitimate power can be
regarded as a very positive means for supply chain management. However, on the other
hand, if the other participants perceive the position as unfairly obtained, it can be just
the opposite.
Referent power turned out to have a positive effect on both coordination and cooper-
ation. Because referent power stems from image and reputation, it is evident that the
strength of the motivation to comply with this type of power would be based on the
strength of the image and attractiveness of the relationship. An explanation might be
that image and status symbols are highly valued in Russian culture (Hofstede and
Hofstede 2005). A similar example has been shown for the Ukraine agri-food business.
Suppliers of well-known foreign processors and retailers had fewer problems obtaining
loans at more favorable interest rates because to some extent, doing business with a
foreigner was regarded as a kind of status symbol (Gagalyuk and Hanf 2009). Taking
into account the discussed issues, the use of referent power is highly advisable.
Conclusions
Although power relationships are beginning to receive more attention from researchers,
only a few scientific works have studied power in the context of supply chain. In this
context, power represents one of the major elements of the supply chain management.
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By analyzing the different sources of power (coercive, reward, expert, legitimate,
referent, informational), we have also confirmed that these sources can be
grouped as coercive and non-coercive. Using this classification, we have con-
ducted a literature overview on power effects and have found that power has
many multifaceted effects on coordination and cooperation in supply chain
relationships.
We worked out and tested a theoretical model of the effects of power on cooperation
and coordination and discuss possible managerial implications of using power as an
effective tool for promoting SCM. To verify our research hypotheses, we conducted 89
semi-structured, in-depth, expert interviews via telephone about relationships of inter-
national food processing companies with their suppliers in Russia and tested the model
using the partial least squares (PLS) approach.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. In spite of our assumption that
coercive power can be seen to bring order and discipline into the relationship as
well as be effective in changing behavior, the effects of coercive power turned out
to be negative on both coordination and cooperation. According to our assump-
tions, reward power should have a negative effect on cooperation and a positive ef-
fect on coordination. Expert power turned out to have positive effects on
coordination and cooperation. The effects of informational power are similar to
the effects of expert power, though the effect in the case of informational power
on cooperation is much weaker than that of expert power. According to the find-
ings, the effects of legitimate power turned out to be positive for coordination and
negative for cooperation. One must admit, though, that in spite of the positive sign
of the effect on coordination, the strength of this effect turned out to be weak.
Referent power turned out to have a positive effect on both coordination and
cooperation.
Endnotes
1However, many authors who have studied power agree that there seems to be a
problem in defining it (Bierstedt 1950). Having examined the different perspectives
of power, we conclude that its definitions in different sciences resemble each other
with a difference of the context in which it is applied (Cook and Emerson 1978;
Cox 2004; Cox et al. 2004; Ireland 1999). One point is clear: the one who pos-
sesses power over another possesses the ability to cause that party to do something
that it would not otherwise have done. We conclude that power generally refers to
the ability, capacity, or potential to get others to do something; to command; to
influence; to determine; or to control the behaviors, intentions, decisions, or
actions of others in the pursuit of one’s own goals or interests despite resistance,
as well as to induce changes.
2These bases can also be dichotomized into coercive and non-coercive power (Hunt
and Nevin 1974).
3Because the group of retailers was quite small, we were able to conduct only eight
interviews with them. For model assessment, we deleted retailers from the sample to
sustain the homogeneity of the units of analysis and avoid biased results. Therefore, the
response rate represented 8.9 %.
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